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Reporting Child Abuse: When Moral
Obligations Fail
Child abuse is not a new phenomenon, I yet the scope of child abuse
generally was not perceived until Dr. C. Henry Kempe first coined the
term "the battered child syndrome" in an article in the Journal of the
American Medical Association.2 The publicity resulting from Dr.
Kempe's article led to legislation in all 50 states designed to identify
and protect abused children.3 This legislation generally has taken three
forms: 1) reporting statutes, 2) criminal statutes and 3) juvenile court
or family court statutes which provide means for removing the child
from the custody of abusive caretakers.
A primary goal of any effort to protect children necessarily must be
to bring the abuse to the attention of the juvenile authorities to prevent
future harm to the child.4 To promote this goal, every state in the
union has adopted some form of legislation requiring specified profes-
sionals to report suspected cases of abuse.5 Although this is an impor-
tant preventive measure, the narrow scope of many of these statutes
leaves many children unprotected. Statutes invariably require physi-
cians to report suspected abuse,6 but there is no guarantee that an
abused child will be taken to the doctor. In some instances, parents,
aware of their culpability and fearful of prosecution, have determined
that medical treatment should not be sought.7
In addition to requiring reports of child abuse from medical practi-
tioners, California statutes also require numerous occupational groups,
1. See generally, Radbill, A History of Child Abuse and Infanticide in the BATTERED CHILD
3,3-19 (R. Hefler & H. Kempe, ed., 2d ed., 1974); Parker & Adelman, Child Abuse Reporting
Laws-Some Legislative History, 34 GEO. WASH. L. REV. 482, 482-90 (1966).
2. Kempe, Silverman, Steele, Droegemueller, & Silver, The Battered Child Syndrome, 181
J.A.M.A. 17 (1962).
3. For a discussion and listing of these statutes see J. COSTA & G. NELSON, CHILD ABUSE
AND NEGLECT: LEGISLATION, REPORTING AND PREVENTION, (1978); Paulsen, ChildAbuse Re-
porting Laws: The Shape of the Legislation, 67 COLUM. L. REV. 1, 6-30 (1967).
4. See, Note, The Battered Child Logic in Search ofLaw, 8 SAN DIEGO L. REV. 364, 389
(1974); Fraser, A Glance At the Past, A Gaze At the Present, A Glimpse at the Future: .4 Critical
Anal ofthe Development of Child Abuse Reporting Statutes, 54 CHI-KENT L. REV. 641, 645,(1977-78).
5. Paulsen, The Law andAbused Children, in THE BATTERED CHILD, 153, 158 (R. Hefler &
H. Kempe ed., 2d ed. 1974).
6. Id. at 161.
7. See People v. Bullard, 75 Cal. App. 3d 764, 768-69, 142 Cal. Rptr. 473, 476 (1977).
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including teachers, 8 licensed day care operators,9 film developers, '0 and
other persons" who come into regular contact with children in the
scope of their employment to report suspected child abuse. Authorities
point out, however, that the most serious injuries and the greatest
number of deaths from the battered child syndrome are inflicted upon
children under three years of age' 2 who have little opportunity to main-
tain contact or visibility with others outside the home.' 3 Thus, for many
children under school age, there is little chance that their peril will be
discovered through occupational channels. Statistics on the actual oc-
currence of child battering vary depending on the source, 14 but authori-
ties agree that a great many cases are never detected.' 5
Even when detected, child abuse often is not reported. Failure to
report child abuse occurs among those required to report by statute, 16
as well as the general citizenry.' A review of criminal prosecutions
and literature on child battering provides disturbing examples of situa-
tions in which people knew of severe cases of physical abuse of small
children and failed to intervene on behalf of the child.' 8 In one case of
child battering, both a neighbor and the child's grandfather saw the
child's injuries and offered to take the child to the hospital for treat-
ment. When their offers were rejected by the child's mother, neither




12. D. GIL, VIOLENCE AGAINST CHILDREN, 44 (1970); see also Appendix to the Journal of
the Cal. Assem. Assembly Interim Committee on Criminal Procedure, Vol. 2., No. 8 Regular
Session 69, 70 (1965). The report stated that one in four of all investigated cases involved death of
the victim. Eighty percent of these children were under four years old and fifty percent were
under two years old. Id. [Hereinafter cited as Interim Committee Report].
13. Fraser, The Child and His Parents. A Delicate Balance of Rights, CHILD ABUSE AND
NEGLECT 315, 328 (R. Hefier & C. Kemple 1976).
14. Brown & Truitt, Ci'il Liability in Child Abuse Cases, 54 CHI-KENT L. REv. 753, 754
(1977-78). (500,000 instances in 1971); Fraser, supra note 4, at 644 (between 665,000 and 1,675,000
instances).
15. See, e.g., Bourne & Newberger, Violence Toward Children in the United States in CRITI-
CAL PERSPECTIVES ON CHILD ABUSE, 53, 55 (Gelles ed., 1979) (citing numerous attempts to quan-
tify the actual incidences and concluding that no one knows).
16. A 1960 report by the Massachusetts Society for the Prevention of Cruelty to Children
reported that although doctors had seen 30% of all children reported that year, they had reported
only 9%. Note, supra note 4, at 23-24. A later survey demonstrated that only 1.6% of all child
abuse reports filed in the United States came from physicians. Brown & Truitt, supra note 14, at
761. Many reasons for underreporting by physicians have been identified by others and include
disbelief that their patients were capable of intentionally harming their children as well as reti-
cence to become involved in the legal system. Id. Another reason for underreporting is dislike of
the punitive nature of the system for protecting children. Goodpastor & Angel, ChildAbuse and
The Law: The Calfornia System, 26 HASTINGS L.J. 1081, 1123 (1975); see also Kohlman, Mal-
practice Liabilityfor Failing to Report Child Abuse 49 CAL. S.B.J. 118, 121 (1974).
17. Fraser argues that reporting statutes must focus on nonprofessionals to be truly effective.
Fraser, supra note 4, at 646.
18. People v. Bullard, 75 Cal. App. 3d 765, 767, 142 Cal. Rptr. 473, 474 (1977). People v.
Aeschilman, 28 Cal. App. 3d 460,464-68, 104 Cal. Rptr. 689, 691-93 (1972) For an other example
see FONTANA, SOMEWHERE A CHILD IS CRYING 139-40 (1973).
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party took further steps to protect the child19 even though the neighbor,
a former nurse, subsequently testified that the little girl's head was
swollen two to three times its normal size, that the child's eyes were
both blackened and swollen shut, and that a patch of hair was missing
from her head.20  The neighbor had also heard the events that
culminated in the injuries,2' thus leaving little doubt that she must have
known of the child's perilous situation.
Failure to act on behalf of the child is a precursor to further injury.2 2
In the absence of intervention, child battering typically escalates and
more serious injuries are inflicted upon the child.23 Furthermore, the
perpetrator may believe that acquiescence by knowledgeable adults is a
form of acceptance. Acquiescence may serve to reinforce the abuser's
belief that the child deserves these beatings.24 The child is thus in dan-
ger of future beatings.
Two major approaches utilized by governments and child protective
organizations to overcome the failure to report abuse have been public
awareness campaigns25 and civil immunity for defamation when a re-
port of child abuse is made in good faith.26 Awareness and civil immu-
nity are only a part of the solution, however, because even those who
have recognized a case of child battering still may choose not to report
or become involved.27 Nonetheless, as a general rule,2" no recognized
legal duty is imposed upon the general citizenry to report child abuse
or other crimes, nor has the law recognized a general duty grounded in
tort to come to the aid of another.29 The state, therefore, leaves protec-
19. Bullard, 75 Cal. App. 3d at 767, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 474.
20. Id.
21. Id.
22. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 412, n. 9, 551 P. 2d 389, 395, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 75
(1976).
23. Id.
24. SeeAeschilman, 28 Cal. App. 3d at 464-65, 104 Cal. Rptr. at 691-92.
25. These campaigns have culminated in observance of child abuse month, day and year.
See generally Paulsen, Parker & Adelman, supra note I, at 484.
26. See CAL. PENAL CODE §1 1172. See generally J. COSTA & G. NELSON supra note 3; Paul-
sen, supra note 3 (for an overview of statutes in other jurisdictions).
27. See supra notes 18-21 and accompanying text.
28. Vermont is the only state in the United States to have codified a general duty to rescue,
providing criminal sanctions for failure to prevent harm where the risk to the rescuer is minimal.
VT. STAT. ANN., tit. 12, §519 (1971); see also, Franklin, Vermont Requires Rescue: 4 Comment, 25
STAN. L. REv. 51, 54 (1972-73). Criminal legislation requiring rescue whenever the risk to the
potential rescuer is small has also been adopted in most of western Europe. See generally, Daw-
son, Negotiorum Gestio: The Altruistic Intermeddler, 74 HARV. L. REv. 817 (1961). In keeping
with these statutes, the rescuer who does suffer a loss in fulfilling the statutory duty may be com-
pensated by the rescuee under the Roman law theory ofnegotiorum gestio. Id. at 1108-26. Some
of the problems which arise in this area were recently exemplified by an incident in a bar in which
a woman was raped by several men while several other male patrols stood by and watched the
assault. See The Duties ofa Bystander, NEwswEEK, March 28, 1983 at 79.
29. W. PROSSER, LAw OF TORTS, 340 (4th ed. 1980).
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tion of small victims of parental abuse to the individual consciences30
of the vast majority of potential reporters who may, and often do,
choose silence. This comment proposes that in the case of abused chil-
dren whose salvation may be entirely in the hands of others, the law
should impose a legal duty to intervene on behalf of the child and pro-
vide abused children with a remedy when this duty is breached. If
courts would allow the child to collect compensatory damages from
anyone who fails to report child abuse, otherwise reluctant witnesses
would be more likely to come forward and provide early detection
which the child desperately needs.3
Imposing tort liability on nonreporters would not only compensate
the child, but would provide the most efficient means of enforcing a
general duty to report child abuse. While penal sanctions do provide
deterrence, when deterrence fails, punishment requires the resources of
law enforcement personnel and district attorneys whose priorities may
preclude prosecution of nonreporters. 32  In contrast, the child, as a di-
rect beneficiary of compensatory damages, has an incentive to enforce
the obligation to report.
33
This is not to say that difficulties would not be encountered in en-
forcing the obligation to report abuse. Problems do exist. An initial
hurdle is putting potential rescuers on notice that they will be liable to
the child if they fail to report child abuse. 4 Secondly, situations may
be anticipated in which the potential rescuer fails to report, but subse-
quently decides that a report should be made. A report at this later
date actually may expose the reporter to tort liability for failing to re-
port when knowledge of the abuse first was acquired.35  Third, distin-
30. Id. at 341. Prosser states that the "voice of conscience . . . [is] singularly ineffective
either to prevent the harm or to compensate the victim." Id.
31. See Note Implications of Research on .41truism, 55 IND. L. J. 551, 552-61 (1980); Rudolph,
The Duty to Act: A Proposed Rule, 44 NEB. L. REv. 499, 499 (1965).
32. See Brown & Truitt, supra note 16, at 761. There are no reported cases of criminal prose-
cutions for failing to report child abuse. Id.
33. For example, the defendant, Flood, in Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 414-415, 551
P.2d 389, 396-97, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 76-77 (1976), was not criminally prosecuted.
The child, as an infant, will be dependent upon others to instigate and prosecute a civil suit.
Means for providing the child with a personal advocate already exist. When a dependency hear-
ing is held involving battered children. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §300(d). Welfare and Institu-
tions Code section 318 requires the court to appoint counsel for the child. Subsection (d) of
section 318 explicitly provides that counsel's duties include determining whether the child has a
cause of action against anyone mandated to report suspected abuse under the reporting statute.
(CAL. PENAL CODE §11172). If the child has been injured sufficiently to have a legitimate cause of
action against a potential rescuer, in all probability a dependency hearing will be held. Alterna-
tively, a suit might be instigated by foster parents or family members who are not themselves
implicated in the abuse. Family members who are susceptible to liability for breaching the duty to
report are no longer immune from liability in California. See supra notes 85-87 and accompany-
ing text.
34. See Fraser, supra note 4, at 658.
35. See Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 406-07, 551 P.2d at 392, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 72 (damages were
claimed for all subsequent injuries from the time the tortfeasor should have reported the abuse).
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guishing legitimate punishment from abuse inevitably may lead to fine
lines of distinction.36
A comprehensive solution to these problems is beyond the scope of
this comment. Some brief suggestions, however, will be made. First,
information regarding the duty to report may be disseminated through
the use of the media as case law develops.37 While recognizing that all
citizens are not well informed, some jurisdictions have imposed crimi-
nal liability upon all citizens for failing to report abuse.38 Presumably
the legislative bodies that impose this broad obligation have concluded
that the costs of imposing liability upon the unwary are exceeded by
the benefits of requiring reports to be made. As a second suggestion, to
assure that civil liability does not prevent tardy reporting, immunity for
previous recalcitrance could be triggered by a timely subsequent re-
port.39 Finally, determining whether the child's condition would have
put reasonable persons on notice of abuse is a question properly left to
the jury. The jurors, in considering all of the circumstances, are in the
best position to determine when a reasonable person would have recog-
nized allegedly abusive conduct that exceeds the scope of legitimate
parental authority.
This comment will examine both common-law and statutory grounds
for imposing tort liability to determine whether a cause of action can be
sustained by the battered child against the nonreporter of abuse. Three
possible theories for imposing a duty to rescue in child battering situa-
tions are explored. First, this comment will demonstrate that Califor-
nia courts in special circumstances have abrogated another general rule
barring liability on the ground that no duty exists. Special circum-
stances imposing a duty of care may be found where the foreseeable
risk of harm is great and the means of prevention are not overly bur-
densome.4" The second theory for imposing a duty to rescue the bat-
tered child requires finding that a special relationship exists between the
potential reporter and either the child or the perpetrator of the abuse.4 2
Third, criminal sanctions for persons permitting child abuse to occur
36. Brown & Truitt, supra note 14, at 757-58.
37. See Fraser, supra note 4, at 658-59.
38. Id. at 658. (20 states require any person to report known abuse).
39. To the extent that liability is judicially recognized, affirmative defenses may also be judi-
cially recognized or abrogated to further the policy of encouraging reports. See generally Li v.
Yellow Cab Co., 13 Cal. 3d 804, 829, 532 P.2d 1226, 1243, 119 Cal. Rptr. 858, 875-76 (1975).
40. See Fraser, supra note 4, at 659.
41. See, e.g., Hergenrether v. East, 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P. 2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964);
Richardson v. Ham, 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955); Enders v. Apcoa Inc., 55 Cal. App. 3d
897, 127 Cal. Rptr. 751 (1976).
42. In the absence of a special relationship there is no duty to protect another from the acts of
a third person. See, e.g., Davidson v. City of Westminster, 32 Cal. 3d 197, 203, 649 P.2d 897, 897,
185 Cal. Rptr. 252, 255 (1982); Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 779, 139 Cal.
Rptr. 82, 86 (1973).
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will be proposed as an alternative means of imposing a civil duty to
prevent child battering. Under the presumption of negligence doctrine,
the violation of a criminal statute also may lead to civil liability.43
These three bases of liability are exceptions to the common-law rule
denying liability for failing to aid another or failing to protect persons
from the foreseeable acts of third parties. An examination of the his-
torical background of the "no duty to rescue" rule reveals that the un-
derlying rationales for denying liability are not applicable to situations
involving child abuse.
I. COMMON-LAW PRINCIPLES OF DuTY
Under the common law, absent a special relationship, a person is not
obligated to come to the aid of another.' This doctrine is rooted in the
common-law distinction between action and inaction, or misfeasance
and nonfeasance.45 The principle distinguishing misfeasance from
nonfeasance is that, while a person owes a duty not to cause harm to
another by an affirmative act or omission, no similar duty exists to be-
stow a benefit upon an individual who is in peril when the peril has not
been created by the potential rescuer. 6
Arguments postulated in support of the "no duty rule" are based
upon the rugged individualism of the common law, which historically
has regarded individuals as independent and self-reliant.47 Courts and
commentators also have expressed concern for the ramifications of im-
posing a duty to rescue in situations in which fifty potential rescuers
stand by and fail to act.48 Additionally, the desirability of using tort
liability to force altruism upon individuals has been questioned.49 Fi-
nally, opponents argue that a general duty to rescue should not be im-
posed because of the administrative difficulties inherent in determining
what action would have been sufficient and similarly, whether protec-
tive action was feasible.
5 0
Taken together, these objections bear little relation to the realities of
situations involving the battered child syndrome. Battered children
clearly do not fit the common-law portrait of independent and self-
43. See infra notes 151-57 and accompanying text.
44. See supra note 42.
45. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 338.
46. Weinrib, The Case for a Duty to Rescue, 90 YALE L. J. 247, 247 (1980).
47. McNiece and Thornton, Affirmative Duties in Tort, 58 YALE L. J. 1272, 1288 (1949).
48. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, n. 5, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 23 (1976); McNiece & Thornton, supra note 47, at 1288.
49. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 338-43; see Weinrib, supra note 46 at 261. Weinrib distin-
guishes acts requiring "the heroism of sacrifice that characterize the morality of aspiration," from
acts which evoke moral censure indicating that the rescue was "obligatory and not superogatory".
Id.
50. McNiece & Thornton, supra note 47, at 1289.
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reliant individuals.51 Secondly, the typical scenario under which child
battering takes place-repeatedly and behind closed doors52-negates
the problems that would arise in determining liability in emergencies
when numerous potential rescuers stood by. Third, requiring the res-
cue of a battered child need not lead to an onerous burden forcing
heroic behavior upon those of faint heart.53 Rather, all that the law
should require is a report to law enforcement or child protective
agencies.
In circumstances in which the defendant alleges that reporting the
battery would have resulted in a substantial risk of harm to the res-
cuer,54 existing principles support allowing the reasonableness of the
fear to be decided by the trier of fact." The administrative difficulties
encountered in the rescue situation are no greater than in other areas of
tort law. 6 Under the accepted negligence standard, the question to be
determined in delineating liability is whether the actor acted as a rea-
sonable person would under like circumstances. 57  Similarly, the fac-
tual determination to be made when child abuse is not reported is
whether, given the circumstances, a reasonable person would have no-
tified the authorities that a child was in danger. 8 Moreover, any ad-
ministrative difficulties become insignificant when weighed against the
harm inflicted upon battered children and the public when child bat-
tering is not stopped. 9
51. People v. Stritzinger, 137 Cal. App. 3d 126, 130, 186 Cal. Rptr. 750, 752 (1982).
52. Schwartz & Hirsh, Child Abuse and Neglect: 4 Survey of the Law, winter, MEDICAL
TRIAL TECH QUARTERLY 272,322 (1982); Comment, Evidentiary Problems in Criminal ChildAbuse
Prosecutions, 63 GEO. L. J. 257, 259 (1974); Comment, EvIdentiary Problems of Proof in Child
Abuse Cases: Why Family and Juvenile Courts Fail, 13 J. FAM. L. 819, 827-28 (1973-74).
53. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
54. See McNiece & Thornton, supra note 47, at 1288; Weinrib, supra note 46, at 250. (Antici-
pated defenses might include allegations that reporting the battering would likely result in an
assault upon the reporter.)
55. For instance, when a criminal defendant alleges self defense, the reasonableness of the
degree of force used is a question for the trier of fact. See, e.g., W. LAFAVE & A. SCOTT, JR.,
HANDBOOK ON CRIMINAL LAW 392-93 (1972).
56. Commentators and California courts have refuted the suggestion that administrative dif-
ficulties singularly can justify denying a remedy to an injured plaintiff. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem
Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 403, 525 P.2d 669, 682, 115 Cal. Rptr. 765, 778 (1974); Dillon v. Legg,
68 Cal. 2d 723, 739, 441 P.2d 912, 917-18, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 77-78 (1968). Weinrib argues that:
"Because legal language is very often 'open textured' the vagueness of a legal principle cannot be
a sufficient ground for repudiating it, especially in a tort system that enshrines the concept of
reasonableness as a fundamental notion." Weinrib, supra note 46, at 275; see also McNiece &
Thornton, supra note 38, at 1289. Rudolph, supra note 31, at 512-36 (for a discussion attempting
to resolve some of these problems).
57. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS §314A comments e & f (1965).
58. See Weinrib, supra note 46, at 275.
59. See Kohiman, supra note 16, at 184. An estimated 20,000 children per year are battered.
Of these, estimates are that one quarter will suffer permanent injury or death. Id. at 119.
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II. THE CALIFORNIA APPROACH TO DUTY
A. Public Policy Factors
California courts, in keeping with their long recognized responsibil-
ity to update and re-examine common-law tort principles, 60 have over-
ruled outmoded common-law rules in the past6' by weighing the
interests of the plaintiff and defendant in conjunction with public pol-
icy factors. The policy factors to be considered in determining the
existence of a duty have been stated in various ways.62 In an often
quoted case, the requisite policy considerations were posited as:
(1) The social utility of the activity out of which the injury arises,
compared with the risks involved in its conduct; (2) the kind of per-
son with whom the actor is dealing; (3) the workability of a rule of
care, especially in terms of the parties' relative ability to adopt practi-
cal means of preventing injury; (4) the relative ability of the parties
to bear the financial burden of the injury and the availability of
means by which the loss may be shifted or spread; (5) the body of
statutes and judicial precedents which color the parties' relationship;
(6) the prophylactic effect of a rule of liability.
63
The following discussion will demonstrate that these policy factors sup-
port finding a duty to rescue abused children.
The first factor to be addressed is the social utility of the conduct
giving rise to the injury. Society pays dearly when abuses are inflicted
upon children. Authorities on child abuse have found that previously
abused children make up the bulk of violent criminals in society to-
day 4 and that today's child abusers are yesterday's abused children.65
Society has nothing to gain in adhering to the view that people should
60. Rodriguez v. Bethlehem Steel Corp., 12 Cal. 3d 382, 393-94, 525 P.2d 669, 678, 115 Cal.
Rptr. 765, 772, (1974); People v. Pierce, 61 Cal. 2d 879, 882, 395 P.2d 893, 895, 40 Cal. Rptr. 845,
847 (1964).
61. See, e.g., Rodriguez, 12 Cal. 3d 382, 385, 525 P. 2d 669, 670, 815 Cal. Rptr. 765, 766
(1974); Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 722,748,441 P.2d 912, 925, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 85 (1968); Rowland
v. Christian, 69 Cal. 2d 103, 109, 443 P.2d 561, 567, 70 Cal. Rptr. 97, 103 (1968).
62. Compare Duarte v. City of San Jose, 100 Cal. App. 3d 648, 658, 161 Cal. Rptr. 140, 145
(1980); Bartell v. Palos Verdes Peninsula School District, 83 Cal. App. 3d 499, 500, 147 Cal. Rptr.
898, 902 (1978), with Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified School Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 822, 131
Cal. Rptr. 854, 859-60, (1976), Raymond v. Paradise School District, 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 31 Cal.
Rptr. 847, 851 (1963).
63. Raymond v. Paradise School District, 218 Cal. App. 2d 1, 8, 31 Cal. Rptr. 847, 851-52
(1963).
64. The California Commission on Crime Control and Violence Prevention recently issued a
report finding that child abuse is almost a precursor to violence and recommended that corporal
punishment be banished in the home and in schools. Sacramento Bee, Apr. 13, 1983, at p. A3, col.
1. See Bourne & Newberger, supra note 9, at 33; CHILD ABUSE AND NEGLECT; THE FAMILY AND
THE COMMUNITY 63 (R. Hefler, C. McKinney & C. Kempe ed. 1976); see also, Adler, ChildAbuse
Victims: Are They Also Victims of an Adversarial and Hierarchical Court System?, 5 PEPPERDINE
L. REv. 717, 718 (1977-78).
65. Adler, supra note 55, at 718.
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mind their own business when family matters are at issue.6 6 Protection
of the child and treatment for the family can only be implemented
through reporting.67
The second factor-the kind of person with whom the actor is deal-
ing-provides compelling reasons for protecting abused children since
the law has consistently required a greater degree of care from those
who encounter children. 68 The earliest cases distinguishing the duties
owed to children from the duties owed to adults involved the attractive
nuisance doctrine.69 The common law barred trespassers from suing
landowners for injuries sustained because of dangerous conditions ex-
isting on the land. The attractive nuisance doctrine allowed courts to
overcome common-law barriers to landowner liability for injuries suf-
fered by child trespassers, while leaving intact the general no duty rule.
California courts also have placed affirmative duties on street vendors
to protect children from the foreseeable acts of others when a relation-
ship previously was established7" and when the purveyor has had no
previous contact with the child.7 ' In both of these situations the courts
took notice of the inability of children to protect themselves from dan-
gers foreseeable to adults.
The abused child's helplessness can be put into better perspective by
examining the general standard of care required of children. For ex-
ample, the child's standard of care, unlike that of adults, is contingent
upon the individual child's age and maturity.72 Children under four
years of age rarely are capable of contributory negligence 73 and, like
abused children, cannot be expected to protect themselves from danger.
Legal principles which recognize the vast difference between the capa-
bilities of adults and children to guard against unreasonable risks con-
form with requiring a duty to rescue abused children when the child's
physical integrity is at stake.
Further support for requiring rescue of the abused child is found in
the third factor-the workability of a rule of care. A simple measure
like phoning a law enforcement or child protective agency is all that
66. See Paulsen, supra note 5, at 162. ("While generally we should not wish to encourage the
"snooping' neighbor . . the possibility of ending a child's agony ought to allow an
exception...").
67. Brown, Fox & Hubbard, Medical and Legal Aspects of Ihe Battered Child Syndrome, 50
Cm-KENT L. REv. 45, 64 (1973).
68. See generally 4 B. WITKIN, SUMMARY OF CALIFORNIA LAW, Torts, 2788 (8th ed. 1974).
69. See id. at 2874.
70. Schwartz v. Helms Bakery Limited, 67 Cal. 2d 232, 236, 430 P.2d 68, 70, 60 Cal. Rptr.
510, 512 (1967).
71. Ellis v. Trower Frozen Products, Inc., 264 Cal. App. 499, 503, 70 Cal. Rptr. 487, 490
(1968).
72. B. WITKIN, supra note 68, at 2785.
73. Id.
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should be required to fulfill the obligation to rescue abused children. 4
The rescuer in most instances incurs no risk, for the law provides ano-
nymity and immunity to those who report child abuse in good faith."
Furthermore, the relative ability of the parties to prevent the injury
clearly favors imposing a duty to act on the child's behalf. Child abuse
victims are "virtual prisoners of their abusers."76 These children can
only hope for better days, as self-protection is unrealistic.
Fourth, the relative ability of the parties to bear the cost of the injury
is also weighted in favor of the child. Children as a class do not have
the ability to provide for themselves. In contrast, rescuers, as a class,
have the potential ability to earn money and purchase homeowner's
insurance covering general negligence liability." Even if insurance is
unavailable to distribute the costs,78 the relative ability of the two
classes to bear the burden of the costs of the injury is still weighted in
favor of the child.
The fifth factor supporting the recognition of a duty includes the
body of statutes and judicial precedents coloring the relationship of the
parties. As previously noted,79 the common law historically has re-
quired greater care when a person's conduct involves a risk of harm to
children. California courts, in addressing other questions of duty, have
stated that the duty concept actually may focus upon the rights of the
injured plaintiff rather than upon the obligations of the defendant.8 0 A
demonstration, therefore, will be made that the child's interest in a safe
environment is substantial and should take precedence over the inter-
ests of potential rescuers in remaining uninvolved.
The importance of a child's interest in physical integrity has been
recognized by California courts in various circumstances. The Califor-
nia Supreme Court held in In Re Angelia P. 8 that the interest of the
state in promoting a safe environment for children is paramount to the
fundamental right of parents to raise and enjoy custody of their chil-
74. See CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(0 (making investigation of child abuse reports
obligatory).
75. Id. §11172.
76. See supra note 50.
77. The availability of insurance would appear to be of limited importance to the courts. See
Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 153, 577 P.2d 669, 674, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534, 539 (1978).
The court, having found several policy factors favoring the imposition of civil liability on social
hosts, assumed that insurance would be made available, (emphasis added). Id ; see also Pamela L.
v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980). The court, in imposing liability on a
social host for the acts of her husband, made no mention of insurance. Id.
78. See supra note 77.
79. See supra notes 69-72 and accompanying text.
80. Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 823-24, 131 Cal. Rptr.
854, 860 (1976). See Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 734, 441 P.2d 912, 916, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 76
(1968).
81. 28 Cal. 3d 914, 623 P.2d 198, 171 Cal. Rptr. 637 (1981).
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dren. 2 Angelia's parents challenged the standard of proof required to
permanently sever the parent-child relationship, arguing that the stan-
dard should be "beyond a reasonable doubt" due to the parental inter-
ests involved. 3 The court, however, held that clear and convincing
proof of unfitness was sufficient since the primary goal of adjudications
that sever parental rights is to protect the interests of the child.8 4 Addi-
tionally, in Gillette v. Gillette,8 5 the landmark decision abrogating pa-
rental immunity for willful misconduct in disciplining children, the
court held that children, like all other persons, have a right to freedom
from physical injuries.8 6 Like the "no duty to rescue rule," parental
immunity was a common-law doctrine which served to deny the child a
remedy for abuse.87 By focusing once again on the child's interests in a
life free from abuse, the courts can seize the opportunity to abrogate
the "no duty to rescue rule."
Other legislative policies, set forth below, indicate that the child's
interest in physical integrity is worthy of the highest protection. For
example, in proceedings to terminate parental custody due to abuse or
neglect, the child statutorily is provided separate counsel 8 whose du-
ties include determining whether the child has a cause of action in tort
for violation of the California mandatory reporting statute.8 9 The leg-
islature has also provided immunity for persons who are required to
report abuse when unauthorized x-rays or pictures of the child are
taken for the purpose of discovering or proving abuse.90 In addition,
the husband and wife evidentiary privilege has been abolished in de-
pendency hearings. A supplemental rule, which prevents the use of any
otherwise privileged testimony given in the dependency proceedings
from being used in any other action, replaces the privileges recognized
in other causes of action.91 Even more significantly, the strong prohibi-
tion against warrantless searches and arrests has been weakened to pro-
tect abused children, who may be removed from the home without a
warrant by an investigator or detained by a medical facility when abuse
is suspected.92 These policies demonstrate that the substantial interest
82. See id. at 916, 638 P.2d at 202, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
83. Id. at 915, 628 P.2d at 201, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 640.
84. Id. at 919, 628 P.2d at 204, 171 Cal. Rptr. at 643.
85. 168 Cal. App. 2d 102, 335 P.2d 736 (1959).
86. Id. at 105, 335 P.2d at 737.
87. See Note, Torts: Parental Liability to a Minor Childfor Injuries Caused by Excessive Pun-
ishment, 11 HASTINGS L.J. 335, 335 (1960).
88. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §318.
89. Id. §318 (d) (1980).
90. CAL. PENAL CODE §11171.
91. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §355.7.
92. Id. §305(a).
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of children in a safe environment is deemed sufficient to take prece-
dence over other competing values.
The final public policy factor to be considered is the prophylactic
effect of imposing a duty to report child abuse. At issue is the need for
early detection of child battering to protect those most vulnerable to
physical abuse. By imposing an affirmative duty to report known in-
stances of child battering, some individuals who might otherwise allow
the abusive conduct to continue would come forward to protect them-
selves from damage awards, if not to protect the child.93 The efficacy of
imposing tort liability to overcome the problem of recalcitrant wit-
nesses defies quantification. The ultimate goal of our legal system,
however, is to affect conduct.94 An assumption therefore can be made
that like other rules of law, imposing a civil duty to report child abuse
will increase the potential for early detection of abusive conduct. 95
This discussion has focused on the public policy factors that support
imposing a duty to report child abuse. The remainder of this comment
is devoted to exploring the theoretical framework by which the duty to
report child abuse can be implemented. The first theory to be discussed
requires an analogy to cases holding that "special circumstances" may
lead to a duty where none would otherwise exist.
B. Special Circumstances
The California Supreme Court has recognized that "special circum-
stances" can give rise to a duty to protect others when no duty other-
wise existed.96 Specifically, the court has overruled the "no duty rule"
in special circumstances involving "open vehicle" 97 cases. The first
open vehicle case to come before the California Supreme Court was
Richards v. Stanley."s In that case, the plaintiff alleged that the defend-
ant was negligent because the defendant had left his keys in the igni-
tion of his vehicle, thus enhancing the risk of theft and foreseeable
injury. The court announced a "no duty rule" based on the premise
that no duty was owed that required the vehicle owner to control the
conduct of a third person.9 9 In dicta, however, the court stated that the
93. See Note, supra note 31 at 557-53. Social Exchange theorists believe behavior is guided
by maximizing profits and losses. By imposing legal liability and adding a pecuniary cost to the
moral obligation to rescue, behavior can be changed. Id; see also, Comment, Stalking the Good
Samaritan: Communism, Capitalism and the Duty to Rescue, UTAH L. REV. 529, 543 (1976).
94. See Rudolph, supra note 31, at 499.
95. See supra note 31 and accompanying text.
96. Seesupra note 41.
97. Dillon v. Legg, 68 Cal. 2d 728, 742, 441 P.2d 912, 920, 69 Cal. Rptr. 72, 81 (1968). (cases
of unlocked cars with keys left in the ignition.)
98. 43 Cal. 2d 60, 271 P.2d 23 (1954).
99. Id. at 66, 271 P.2d at 27.
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same acts might have been culpable and subject to redress if the car
had been left where children were at risk.' °°
Subsequently, the California courts, faced with difficult factual situa-
tions, have held that the "no duty rule" was not a bar to recovery when
special circumstances imposed a greater potential of foreseeable risk or
a lesser burden of preventive action. In Richardson v. Ham,"° l the
court found that special circumstances existed because the risks of
harm from a bulldozer were inherently greater than those created by
the defendant in Richards v. Stanley. 02 The court found that bulldoz-
ers were attractive to children, that persons had been known to climb
on them, and the means to avoid the risk of harm were readily avail-
able.0 3 Similarly, in Hergenrether v. East,"° the defendant left his
keys in his partially loaded two ton truck overnight in a "very well
established skid row."' 5 Again, the court held that the foreseeability
that the truck would be stolen and negligently driven was sufficient to
warrant imposing liability. 10 6 The court in Hergenrether stated that
each case must be considered in light of its own facts to determine
whether in toto the facts justify a conclusion that the foreseeable risk of
harm imposed is unreasonable."0 7 Applying this same standard to the
law involving a failure to rescue, the particular circumstances sur-
rounding child abuse may be viewed as sufficiently egregious to require
imposing a duty to prevent the foreseeable acts of the abuser. First,
child battering is a recurring event'08 differing substantially from the
typical rescue situation which requires quick reaction in the face of
substantial danger to the potential rescuer.10 9 Secondly, the situation
meets the minimal burden factor1 0 because an easy method is avail-
able to rescue the child-a telephone call.
Although the "special circumstances" cases have been confined to
open vehicle situations, the same rationale can be applied to other "no
duty" situations without distorting the principles enunciated by the
court. Moreover, the key-in-the-car special circumstances cases ex-
panding the duty to protect others from the acts of third persons
originated from dicta in Richards, which referred specifically to chil-
100. Id.
101. 44 Cal. 2d 772, 285 P.2d 269 (1955).
102. Id. at 776, 285 P.2d at 271.
103. Id.
104. 61 Cal. 2d 440, 393 P.2d 164, 39 Cal. Rptr. 4 (1964).
105. Id. at 443, 393 P.2d at 166, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 6.
106. Id. at 446, 393 P.2d at 167, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
107. Id. at 445, 393 P.2d at 167, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 7.
108. See supra notes 18-22 and accompanying text.
109. See supra note 49 and accompanying text.
110. Hergenrether, 61 Cal. 2d at 444, 393 P.2d at 166, 39 Cal. Rptr. at 6; Richardson v. Ham,
44 Cal. 2d at 776, 285 P.2d at 270.
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dren." Accordingly, the common-law rule denying liability for non-
feasance should not be adhered to when the foreseeable danger is that a
child will continue to be battered by his custodians. Conceivably, by
recognizing the special circumstances inherent in the child's situation,
the court could evaluate the defendant's omission relative to other "no
duty to rescue" scenarios" 2 and reach the conclusion that the special
circumstances inherent in the abused child's situation-the great risk of
harm and the minimal preventive measures required-mandate impos-
ing an affirmative duty to rescue the child upon anyone who has
knowledge of the child's peril. Absent finding a general duty to rescue
battered children based on the special circumstances inherent in the
child's predicament, a duty may be imposed upon a smaller class of
individuals under the special relationship doctrine.
C. Special Relationshios
As has been the case in other jurisdictions, California courts have
circumvented the full impact of the "no duty rule" by relying on an
expanding list of special relationships which permit the imposition of
affirmative duties.' '3 When a person stands in a special relationship to
another, civil liability may be incurred for failing to prevent harm
caused by the criminal, intentionally tortious, or negligent acts of a
third person." 4 A duty to act affirmatively may be found when a po-
tential rescuer bears a special relationship to either the creator of the
peril or the potential victim of the peril."15 Since the special relation-
ship doctrine requires the existence of a relationship of some degree
between the parties, some potential rescuers will fall outside the scope
of this doctrine. For instance, strangers or neighbors who have not be-
friended the child or the perpetrator cannot be said to have a relation-
ship with any of the parties, and thus would not be covered by the
doctrine.
The earliest cases imposing a duty to aid another focused on inn-
keepers" 16 and carriers." 7 Subsequent California cases, however, have
applied the special relationship doctrine to the parent-child relation-
111. Richards, 43 Cal. 2d at 66, 271 P.2d at 27.
112. See supra note 107 and accompanying text.
113. See, e.g., Tarasoffv. Regents of University of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 435, 551 P.2d 334,
343, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14, 23 (1976); Buford v. State of Calif., 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 823, 164 Cal.
Rptr. 264, 271 (1980) RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS §315 at 122 (1965); Harper &
Kline, The Duty to Control the Conduct ofAnother, 43 YALE L. J. 886, 886 (1934).
114. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS §314A, comment d at 120 (1965).
115. Id.
116. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 34; Harper & Kline, supra note 113, at 901-02.
117. Id;see also supra note 116.
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ship," 8 grandparent-child relationship,' 19 and the psychiatrist-patient
relationship. 20
Carrying the doctrine even further, a recent Michigan decision uti-
lized the special relationship doctrine to require rescue between friends
on a social venture. The plaintiff's decedent in Farwell v. Keaton 2' had
been attacked by several other boys while on a social outing with the
defendant. The defendant brought the friend home, but left him in his
car in the driveway of his home without informing anyone of his
friend's presence or need for medical attention.' The defendant ar-
gued that he was under no obligation to render aid to his friend.'2 3 The
court, disagreeing, held that the deceased and defendant, as compan-
ions on a social outing, had entered a special relationship.' 24 Therefore,
since the defendant could render aid without danger to himself, he had
an affirmative duty to do so.'25
While no clear delineation of the factors constituting a special rela-
tionship exists,'2 6 because of the willingness of the courts to apply the
special relationship doctrine to a variety of situations, the doctrine has
been called an expanding concept.'2 7 Professor Prosser has predicted
that courts will find a duty where reasonable men would recognize a
duty to act and agree that a duty exists.'2 8 Both the Restatement (Sec-
ond) of the Law of Torts and California courts have postulated that the
law appears to be heading toward a duty to rescue in any relationship
of dependence or mutual dependence. 2 9 Taken literally, if the law is
heading toward the recognition of a duty to aid or protect in a relation-
ship of dependence, a duty should be acknowledged that will obligate a
person bearing even a slight relationship to an abused child to rescue
118. RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS §316 (1965); Harper & Kline, supra note 113 at
893-95.
119. Poncher v. Brackett, 246 Cal. App. 2d 769, 55 Cal. Rptr. 59 (1966). The court stated,
"ITIhe ability to control the child, rather than the relationship as such is the basis for a finding of
liability." Id. at 772, 55 Cal. Rptr. at 61.
120. Tarasoffv. Regents of Univ. of Calif., 17 Cal. 3d 425, 436, 551 P.2d 334, 343, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 14, 23 (1976).
121. 240 N.W. 2d 217 (Mich. 1976).
122. Id. at 220.
123. Id. at 219.
124. Id. at 220.
125. Id.
126. See Weinrib, supra note 46, at 247-48. But see McNiece & Thornton supra note 47, at
1289 (concluding that the common thread running throughout the special relationship cases is a
previously existing economic relationship benefiting the obligor but maintaining this is insufficient
grounds to limit application).
127. J. A. Meyers & Co. v. Los Angeles County Probation Dept., 78 Cal. App. 3d 309, 315, 144
Cal. Rptr. 186, 189 (1978); Mann v. State of California, 70 Cal. App. 3d 773, 779, 139 Cal. Rptr.
82, 86 (1977).
128. W. PROSSER, supra note 29, at 327.
129. Pamela L. v. Farmer, 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 210, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282, 285 (1980); J. A.
Meyers & Co., 78 Cal. App. 3d at 315, 144 Cal. Rptr. at 189; Mann 70 Cal. App. 3d at 780, 139
Cal. Rptr. at 86; RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS §315 comment b at 123 (1965).
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the child from parental abuse. Friends of the family or child, and fam-
ily members who have knowledge of the child's peril are likely to be
the child's only means of salvation. 3 ' The battered child's dependence
on others to prevent future harm is unquestionable.' 31 Existing princi-
ples support finding a special relationship between abused children and
these adults.
In Pamela L v. Farmer, 32 the court of appeals held that a special
relationship existed between a neighbor and children invited to the
neighbor's home, imposing a duty upon the neighbor to protect the
children from molestation by the neighbor's husband. 33 The court
stated that the children were dependent upon the neighbor because
they were children, '3 4 particularly vulnerable to this type of miscon-
duct 35 and unable to protect themselves against a risk known to the
defendant. 36 The court emphasized the fact that children of tender
years were involved.
137
The circumstances focused upon by the Farmer court also prevail
when the battered child syndrome occurs. The children are of tender
years, particularly vulnerable and unable to protect themselves from a
risk known to the potential rescuer. In Farmer, however, the court also
found that the defendant voluntarily assumed the added duties im-
posed under the special relationship doctrine by inviting the children to
her home. ' 3  Finding the requisite special relationship between the
child and a possible rescuer therefore, will be easiest when a person has
voluntarily assumed the care or custody of the child 139 and the decision
in Farmer can be relied upon. Voluntary assumption of a special duty,
however, does not appear to be a mandatory requirement before courts
will impose liability for nonfeasance. Special knowledge coupled with
an ongoing relationship may also provide grounds for imposing an ob-
ligation to rescue.
In O'Hara v. Western Seven Trees,140 the appellate court imposed
liability upon a landlord for failing to warn or take other precautions
on behalf of his tenants to avert the possibility of another rape occur-
130. See People v. Stritzinger, 137 Cal. App. 3d 126, 130, 186 Cal. Rptr. 750, 752 (1982).
131. Id.
132. 112 Cal. App. 3d 206, 169 Cal. Rptr. 282 (1980).
133. Id. at 209-10, 169 Cal. Rptr. at 285.





139. See RESTATEMENT (SECOND) LAW OF TORTS §314A(4), at 118 (1965). (for example, a
babysitter voluntarily assumes the duty of affirmative action by assuming the custodial
responsibility.)
140. 75 Cal. App. 3d 798, 142 Cal. Rptr. 487 (1977).
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ring in the rented premises. The court held the landlord liable for fail-
ure to warn based upon his superior knowledge,'4 1 as the defendant
alone knew of past assaults and conditions making future assaults
likely to occur. 142 Although the alleged tortious act was clearly an
omission, the court did not feel obligated to determine explicitly that a
special relationship existed or that the affirmative duty to warn was
based upon the landlord's control of the common area. 143 The court,
instead, imposed liability because the landlord was in a position of su-
perior knowledge'" and failed to warn the tenant of the danger.
The leading case applying the special relationship doctrine when the
relationship is between the potential rescuer and the perpetrator is
Tarasoff v. Regents of University of Calfornia .141 The Tarasoff court
held that liability could be imposed upon a psychiatrist who failed to
warn a known victim of his patient's intent to kill. 146 The court, finding
a special relationship between the psychiatrist and patient, left open the
question of whether foreseeability alone was enough to require a duty
to warn. 147 The court, however, laid the groundwork for finding a duty
to warn whenever a foreseeable risk to a known victim is established by
recognizing that "our current crowded and computerized society com-
pels the interdependence of its members."'
148
Subsequent courts addressing the special relationship doctrine have
interpreted Tarasoff as requiring knowledge of a known risk to a
known individual. 149 For instance, in Hooks v. Southern Calfornia
Permanente Medical Group,5 0 the court stated that the duty to warn
was predicated on the existence of a special relationship involving con-
fidence and trust or special knowledge.' 5 ' Two years later, the Califor-
nia Supreme Court again addressed the duty to warn in Davidson v.
Westminster.'52 The plaintiff in Davidson alleged that police officers
breached a duty to warn her of the possibility that she would be the
next victim of an assailant known to the police to be operating in a
laundromat under police surveillance.'53 The court first held that a
141. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
142. Id. at 804, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
143. Id. at 803, 142 Cal. Rptr. at 490.
144. Id.
145. 17 Cal. 3d 425, 551 P.2d 334, 131 Cal. Rptr. 14 (1976).
146. Tarasoff, 17 Cal. 3d at 431, 551 P.2d at 340, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 20.
147. Id. at 435, 551 P.2d at 343, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 23.
148. Id. at 442, 551 P.2d at 347, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 27.
149. See Buford v. State of California, 104 Cal. App. 3d 811, 820-21, 164 Cal. Rptr. 264, 270
(1980); see also Hooks v. Southern Cal. Permanente Medical Group, 107 Cal. App. 3d 435, 444,
165 Cal. Rptr. 741, 746 (1980).
150. 107 Cal. App. 3d 435, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
151. Id. at 444, 165 Cal. Rptr. at 746.
152. 32 Cal. 3d 197, 649 P.2d 894, 185 Cal. Rptr. 252 (1982).
153. Id. at 201, 649 P.2d at 895, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 253.
Pacfic Law Journal / Vol. 15
special relationship could not be supported by the mere fact that the
officers had visually identified the assailant from a distance.'54 The
plaintiff also alleged, however, that the officers had a duty to warn
based on their knowledge of the plaintiff's peril. 55 The court did not
hold that a duty to warn could never be based solely on knowledge of
peril. Rather, the court found that under the facts in Davidson, requir-
ing police officers to warn all potential victims would paralyze the
neighborhood.56 Davidson is distinguishable from Tarasoff and
O'Hara because of the absence of a known risk to a known victim. In
contrast, when child abuse occurs, a known risk to a known victim
from a known assailant does exist.
By analogy to the O'Hara case, the courts can require persons com-
ing into contact with abused children to take affirmative action to pro-
tect the child. When the potential rescuer is an associate of the abuser,
Tarasoff supports imposing civil liability. The potential rescuer, hav-
ing been apprised of the situation, possesses the special ability to pro-
tect the child from further harm. 57 The child in essence becomes
dependent on knowledgeable persons from the moment those persons
comprehend the danger to the child and concomitantly realize that the
child cannot protect himself. As the courts have admonished in other
situations, the duties owed to a child are proportionate to the child's
ability to avoid the perils he may encounter.'58
Finally, the relationship between both the abused children and the
perpetrators of abuse and their friends and family is one of the clearest
cases of dependency imaginable. ' 9 The infirmities of infancy mandate
finding a special relationship between children and others. Courts may
adhere to the no duty to rescue doctrine in other situations by distin-
guishing the degree of dependency that exists in the relationship itself
and the child's peculiar inability to provide self-protection. When the
relationship is very attenuated, the child can circumvent the special re-
154. Id. at 205, 649 P.2d at 898, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 256.
155. Id. at 208, 649 P.2d at 900, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
156. Id. at 209, 649 P.2d at 900, 185 Cal. Rptr. at 258.
157. See Draper Mortuary v. Superior Court, 135 Cal. App. 3d 533, 537, 185 Cal. Rptr. 396,
398 (1982). The court stated:
The basis for analysis of whether or not there is a duty is the relationship of the parties.
For if the conduct of the one who is to be charged with the duty brings him into a human
relationship with another where social policy requires that either affirmative action or
precaution be taken on his part to avoid harm, then a duty to act or to take the precau-
tion should be imposed by law.
1d; see Comment, Liabilityfor Criminal Violence, 13 Loy. L.A. L. REV. 535, 538 (1979-80) (for a
discussion advocating limiting liability for the criminal acts of third parties based on relative
control).
158. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text; Wallace v. Der-Ohanian, 199 Cal. App. 2d
141, 144, 18 Cal. Rptr. 892, 894 (1962).
159. See People v. Stritzinger, 137 Cal. App. 3d 126, 130, 186 Cal. Rptr. 750, 752 (1982).
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lationship problem by alleging that the California Penal Code imposes
an affirmative duty to prevent child abuse upon anyone who has
knowledge of the abuse. The following discussion will demonstrate
that Penal Code Section 273a prohibits anyone from permitting child
abuse.
III. A STATUTORILY IMPOSED DUTY
California courts have used statutes to establish the acceptable stan-
dard of care or to create new duties when none existed at common
law.160 Violation of a statute intended to protect a class of persons of
which the plaintiff is a member from the type of harm suffered gives
rise to the "presumption of negligence" rule.161 California courts, em-
ploying this rule, also have relied upon criminal statutes which require
affirmative acts to find a civil duty to act.
162
Criminal sanctions for child abuse always have been available within
the realm of general assault and homicide statutes. In addition, Cali-
fornia has adopted particularized statutes providing misdemeanor and
felony penalties for child abuse. 63 The particular statute that this com-
ment will analyze is Penal Code section 273a.114 In pertinent part, sub-
160. See e.g. Vesely v. Sager, 5 Cal. 3d 153, 486 P.2d 151, 95 Cal. Rptr. 623 (1971). The court
overruled a long line of cases that had held that a seller of alcoholic beverages was not liable to
persons subsequently injured by the acts of an intoxicated customer. Id. at 157, 486 P.2d at 153,
95 Cal. Rptr. at 623. In Brooks v. E. J. Willis Truck Transportation Company, 40 Cal. 2d 669, 255
P.2d 802 (1953), the Supreme Court found that the defendant was required by criminal legislation
to stop and render aid to a pedestrian whom the defendant hit with his vehicle, regardless of
whether the driver was at fault in causing the harm. ld. at 679, 255 P.2d at 808-09. Under com-
mon law, however, there was no duty to render aid unless a person's conduct was tortious in
creating the harm. Id. See generally Holdych, The Presumption of Negligence Rule in California:
The Common Law and Evidence Code Section 669, 11 PAC. L. J. 907 (1980).
161. This presumption was codified in CAL. EvID. CODE §669 which provides:
(a) The failure of a person to exercise due care is presumed if:
(1) He violated a statute, ordinance, or regulation of a public entity;
(2) The violation proximately caused death or injury to a person or property;
(3) The death or injury resulted from an occurrence of the nature which the statute,
ordinance, or regulation was designed to prevent; and
(4) The person suffering the death or the injury to his person or property was a mem-
ber of the class of persons for whose protection the statute, ordinance, or regulation was
adopted.
(b) This presumption may be rebutted by proof that:
(1) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation did what might reason-
ably be expected of a person of ordinary prudence, acting under similar circumstances,
who desired to comply with the law; or
(2) The person violating the statute, ordinance, or regulation was a child and exer-
cised the degree of care ordinarily exercised by persons of his maturity, intelligence and-
capacity under similar circumstances, but the presumption may not be rebutted by such
proof if the violation occurred in the course of an activity normally engaged in only by
adults and requiring adult qualifications.
162. See general y Holdych, supra note 160, at 920.
163. See CAL. PENAL CODE §§271, 272, 273a, 273d.
164. CAL. PENAL CODE §273a provides:
(1) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions likely to produce great bod-
ily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon unjus-
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divisions (1) and (2) of Penal Code section 273a provide that anyperson
who wilfully causes orpermits any child to suffer, or inflicts thereon
unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering1 65 is guilty of a misde-
meanor or felony.'
66
Analysis of section 273a will be conducted in two stages. First, the
scope of section 273a will be analyzed by looking at the language em-
ployed, past interpretations of similar language in similar contexts, and
the arrangement of section 273a within the scheme of child protection
statutes. The second issue to be addressed is whether interpreting sec-
tion 273a as imposing an affirmative duty to act would be in conflict
with the permissive language of the reporting statute which provides
that persons not specifically mandated to report child abuse may report
known or reasonably suspected cases of abuse.
A. Statutory Interpretation
Section 273a on its face 67 is written broadly enough to impose crimi-
nal liability not only upon the perpetrators of the abuse or those
charged with specific responsibility for caring for the child, but also
upon bystanders who knowingly permit the abuse to occur. Indeed,
any limitation on the scope of conduct covered by section 273a is em-
bodied in the code itself. In particular, the code limits liability to those
who willfully permit child battering. The three terms, "any person,"
"willfully," and "permits," are the controlling words that will be ana-
lyzed in conformance with past judicial interpretations of similar
provisions.
Section 273a uses the broad term anyperson in the first clause of the
statute but in a subsequent clause, section 273a speaks specifically to
persons having the "care or custody"'' 68 of a child. Both clauses penal-
ize those who willfully cause or permit the child's person or health to
be injured, while only the second clause penalizes those who place the
child in a situation in which the child's person or health is endan-
tifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or custody of any child,
willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its person or
health is endangered, is punishable by imprisonment in the county jail not exceeding one
year, or in the state prison for 2, 3 or 4 years.
(2) Any person who, under circumstances or conditions other than those likely to
produce great bodily harm or death, willfully causes or permits any child to suffer, or
inflicts thereon unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering, or having the care or cus-
tody of any child, willfully causes or permits the person or health of such child to be
injured, or willfully causes or permits such child to be placed in such situation that its
person or health may be endangered, is guilty of a misdemeanor.
165. Id.
166. Id.
167. See Coulter v. Superior Court, 21 Cal. 3d 144, 150, 577 P.2d 669, 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534,
537 (1978).
168. CAL. PENAL CODE §273a.
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gered. 16 9 The logical inference to be drawn from the use of these diver-
gent terms is that the wording of the preceding section prohibiting any
person from permitting child abuse was intended to reach persons liv-
ing outside the home who bear no generalized responsibility regarding
the care and custody of the child. Moreover, in two closely related
cases, the courts have interpreted similar language and reached analo-
gous conclusions.
In Brocket v. Kitchen Boyd Motor Company, 7° the appellate court
held that the Business and Professions Code provision prohibiting
"every person" from furnishing alcoholic beverages to minors was ap-
plicable to social hosts.' 71 Furthermore, the California Supreme Court
in Coulter v. Superior Court7 2 held that the term "every person," in
another section of the Business and Professions Code, 7 3 applied to
both commercial and noncommercial suppliers of alcohol. The court
specifically noted that other sections of the Business and Professions
Code contained specific references to "licensees,"' 74 and reasoned that
if the legislature had intended to apply the statute to a narrow class of
persons, the language of the statute would have reflected that intent. 
75
Similarly, none of the other penal provisions dealing with child abuse
imposes criminal liability upon persons who are not the direct perpe-
trators of the abuse.
176
Following the Coulter and Brocket decisions, the legislature disap-
proved Coulter and several other decisions imposing civil liability upon
persons who furnished alcohol to others.'7 7 The legislature, however,
did not disapprove of the court interpretations of those intended to be
covered by the statute, nor did it expressly disapprove Brocket. 78 The
failure of the legislature to mention Brocket can be understood by once
again recognizing that traditionally the duties owed to children have
exceeded those owed to adults.'7 9 Brocket, Coulter, and progeny,
therefore, provide support for interpreting section 273a broadly. Since
section 273a has been amended several times 8 ° with no changes having
been made in the scope of the prohibited acts or omissions, a fair as-
169. Id.
170. 24 Cal. App. 3d 87, 100 Cal. Rptr. 752 (1978).
171. Id. at 93, 100 Cal. Rptr. at 756; CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25658.
172. 21 Cal. 3d 144, 577 P.2d 669, 145 Cal. Rptr. 534 (1978).
173. CAL. Bus. & PROF. CODE §25602.
174. Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 150, 557 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
175. Compare CAL. PENAL CODE §§271, 272, & 273d with id. §273a.
176. Coulter, 21 Cal. 3d at 150, 557 P.2d at 672, 145 Cal. Rptr. at 537.
177. CAL. CIV. CODE §1714.
178. Id; see also Comment, supra note 157, at 539 (stating that not all of the "dram shop"
cases are abrogated).
179. See supra notes 68-73 and accompanying text.
180. 1963 Cal. Stat. c. 783, §1, at 1811 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE §273a); 1965 Cal. Stat. c.
697, §1, at 2091 (amending CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a); 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 1139, §165, at 5108-09
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sumption can be made that the legislature intended the statute to be
broadly applied.
The next term to be addressed is the word "willfully." Willfully im-
plies a purposefulness or willingness to commit or omit a certain act.' 8 '
In construing the term as used in the statute, the predominant view of
the degree of negligence required to violate the statute is criminal negli-
gence.18 2 This necessitates that the defendant's conduct amount to a
reckless, gross, or culpable departure from the ordinary standard of
care. 83 The defendant must act with reckless disregard for life, 84 and
hence must have actual 8 5 or imputed 186 knowledge that the act or
omission tends to endanger another's life. When child abuse is being
perpetrated in a form which would put reasonable persons on notice
that the child is being abused, little doubt can exist that the omission
tends to endanger the child's life.'87 Once a person has acquired
knowledge of child battering, any failure to prevent further battering is
a willful omission.
Finally, section 273a extends criminal liability to persons who "per-
mit" another to inflict unjustifiable physical pain or mental suffering
upon a child. To permit an act does not require that one participate or
encourage the act.'8 8 A person merely must knowingly allow the con-
duct to occur.' 8 9 In interpreting analogous penal provisions, California
courts have held that abstention from preventive action amounts to
permission.190 Absent a legally recognized privilege to act on behalf of
(amending CAL. PENAL CODE §273a); 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 1117, § 4, at 3590 (amending CAL. PENAL
CODE §273a).
181. See People v. Peabody, 46 Cal. App. 3d 43, 46, 119 Cal. Rptr. 780, 781 (1975).
182. People v. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d 861, 879, 285 P.2d 926, 937 (1955); People v. Rodriguez, 186
Cal. App. 2d 433, 440, 8 Cal. Rptr. 863, 868 (1960).
183. Peabody, 46 Cal. App. 2d at 47, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 783.
184. Id. at 48-49, 119 Cal. Rptr. at 783;see also People v. O'Brien, 110 Cal. App. 3d Supp. 1, 4,
168 Cal. Rptr. 105, 107 (1980) (adhering to Peabody).
185. Penny, 44 Cal. 2d at 879, 285 P.2d at 937,Peabody 46 Cal. App. 3d at 47, 119 Cal. Rptr. at
782.
186. Imputed knowledge generally arises when (1) there is a duty to discover dangerous cir-
cumstances. See Roche v. Llewellyn Iron Works Co., 140 Cal. 563, 569, 74 P. 149, 149-50 (1937).
The employer will not be heard to say that he did not know of the dangers or (2) a relationship
exists between two or more entities of such a nature that the law will presume the knowledge of
one is the knowledge of the other. Austin v. Hallmark, 21 Cal. 2d 718, 729, 134 P.2d 777, 784
(1943). The application of imputed knowledge under section 273a, therefore, would seem to be
limited to individuals who have a duty to discover reasonably foreseeable dangers confronting the
child. Thus, imputing knowledge would only be appropriate when prosecuting or imposing liabil-
ity on persons who have control or custody of the child within the confines of the second clause of
section 273a. See CAL. PENAL CODE § 273a.
187. See supra notes 14 and 22.
188. See supra notes 81-82 and accompanying text.
189. Ballasteros v. Alcoholic Bev. Etc. Appeals Bd., 234 Cal. App. 2d 694, 701, 44 Cal. Rptr.
633, 637 (1965); Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. Con. Appeals Bd., 212 Cal. App. 2d 106, 123, 28 Cal.
Rptr. 74, 84 (1963).
190. Harris v. Alcoholic Bev. Con. Appeals Bd., 212 Cal. App. 2d 106, 123, 28 Cal. Rptr. 74,
83 (1963); see also Markus v. Justices Court, 117 Cal. App. 2d 391, 398, 255 P.2d 883, 887 (1953).
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the child, however, permission is conceptually difficult to allege. 19' A
demonstration will be made showing that limited privileges to act for
the benefit of battered and otherwise abused children are already le-
gally provided.
Although no general privilege to interfere in the parent-child rela-
tionship exists'92 when children are mistreated, the power of third per-
sons to act on behalf of the child is statutorily recognized in at least
three ways. Initially, when a parent or other person obligated to sup-
port the child refuses to provide the child with the necessities of life, a
third person may in good faith provide the necessities and recover the
costs from the obligor.193 The necessities of life include medical care' 94
and legal services.' 95 Abused children are in dire need of medico-legal
intervention. In the absence of intervention, the battery is not only
likely to continue, but in all probability will escalate, causing more se-
vere injuries as time goes on.' 96 In addition to the privilege to provide
needed care for the child and to recover the costs of care provided, any
person has the power to initiate a dependency hearing to have a child
removed from an unfit home. 197 Finally, statutes provide that anyone
may report child abuse, 198 making an investigation into the allegations
mandatory. The recognition of privileges allowing outsiders to inter-
vene in family affairs supports the notion that a failure to take even the
most remedial step in the child's behalf-a phone call to law enforce-
ment or child protective authorities-is indeed permissive conduct.'99
The preceding interpretation of section 273a would allow subsequent
application of the presumption of negligence rule to give the battered
child a remedy for breach of the duty imposed.2° Undoubtedly, the
presumption of negligence rule is viable today. Not only has the rule
191. See Dawson, supra note 28, at 817.
192. See Bourne & Newberger, supra note 15, at 54. (There is a delicate balance between the
child's right to protection and parental right to autonomy.)
193. CAL. CIV. CODE §207.
194. In re Ricky H., 2 Cal. 3d 513, 521, 468 P.2d 204, 208, 86 Cal. Rptr. 76, 80 (1970).
195. Id.
196. See supra note 16.
197. CAL. WELF. & INST. CODE §329. This is done by swearing out of an affidavit to the
probation officer who must either start the proceedings or state in writing the reasons for failing to
do so. If the probation officer fails to take action, the petitioner may apply for review by the
juvenile court. Id. §331.
198. CAL. PENAL CODE §11165 (c).
199. See Comment, Stalking the Good Samaritan: Communism, Capitalism and the Duty to
Rescue, 1976 UTAH L. REv. 529 (1976). The author states:
From a philosophical point of view, it does not appear possible to distinguish between
the man who does something and the man who allows something to be done, when he
can interfere.
Id. at 542. (Citing Tunc, The Volunteer andthe Good Samaritan reprinted in, THE GOOD SAMARI-
TAN AND THE LAW. (Rateliff, ed. 1966)).
200. See supra note 160.
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been codified by the legislature,2"' it also has been explicitly applied in
the battered child sphere. In Landeros v. Flood,2"2 the court held that a
doctor's failure to report child abuse as mandated by California Penal
Code section 11166203 would constitute negligence if the plaintiff could
show that the doctor knew or should have known by reason of his diag-
nosis that the plaintiff was a victim of the battered child syndrome.2°
Although no cases of criminal prosecution have been reported under
Penal Code section 273a in which a person was not the perpetrator of
the abuse or a person in the home chargeable with care or custody of
the child, this does not preclude the conclusion that the legislature in-
tended that persons violating the statute should be held responsible for
their acts or omissions. To date, no cases of criminal prosecution of
persons required to report child abuse under the reporting statute have
been reported either. The legislature, however, approved the decision
in Landeros v. Flood, allowing the imposition of liability upon physi-
cians who fail to report child battering.205 Nothing intimates that the
legislature would not also approve interpreting section 273a in the
manner called for by the express language.206 Potential defendants,
however, would likely argue that an extension of liability in this man-
ner contradicts the reporting statute which provides that any person
may report known or suspected abuse.20 7 The following discussion will
demonstrate that this conclusion is neither necessary nor compelling.
B. Penal Code Sections 11166 and 273a.- Conflicting or
Complementary
Penal Code section 11166, the California reporting statute, requires
mandatory reports of suspected child abuse by medical practitioners,20 8
child care custodians, 2°9 nonmedical practitioners, 210 and child protec-
tive agencies.21 Specifically, the statute requires reports whenever any
201. CAL. EVID. CODE §669. For the full text see supra note 161.
202. 17 Cal. 3d 399, 551 P.2d 389, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69 (1976).
203. See supra note 194 and accompanying text.
204. Landeros, 17 Cal. 3d at 410, 551 P. 2d at 394, 131 Cal. Rptr. at 74.
205. See 1980 Cal. Stat. c. 1071, §5 at 3425 (the legislative comments to the 1980 amendment
to Penal Code section 11166).
206. See 65 OPS. CAL. ATTY. GEN. 335, 349-50 (1982) (the entire legislative scheme in the area
of child abuse is aimed at discovering cases and preventing serious harm by prompt action); CAL.
WELF. & INST. CODE §16506. This section provides protective services for children and states:
"Nor shall this part - .-. relieve persons ... from the obligation resting on all citizens to report
crimes. -.".' e-mhasis added) Id; see also 65 OPs. CAL. ATry. GEN. at 350.
207. CAL. PENAL CODE §11166(c).
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of the delineated persons has knowledge of 2 2 or reasonably suspects21 3
that a child has been the victim of child abuse. Persons required to
report, but who fail to do so, may be found guilty of a misdemeanor."z 4
The reporting statute further provides that any other person2 5 who
has knowledge of or observes a child whom he or she reasonably sus-
pects has been a victim of child abuse may report2"6 the abuse. This
provision was added to the statute in 1976.217 According to the Assem-
bly Committee in Criminal Justice, the legislature intended to en-
courage rather than discourage reporting of child abuse. The 1976
Amendment to section 11166 serves the purpose of assuring that a per-
son not previously authorized2 18 to report child abuse will not incur
civil or criminal liability as a result of his report, unless the report was
false and the reporter knew or should have known of the falsity.21 9 The
provision allowing any person to report was not specifically intended to
place a limit upon the duty to report, but rather, to insulate persons
who do report from liability to the alleged abuser for unintentionally
making a false report.220 The permissive language of section 11166(c)
can be explained by examining the substantive differences between the
duties imposed by sections 11166(c) and 273a.
An argument can be made that the legislature purposefully chose not
to hold the general citizenry criminally liable for failing to report child
abuse under any circumstances. An equally plausible explanation,
however, can be found in a brief history of the reporting statute. As
originally adopted, the California reporting statute covered only physi-
cians.2 21 This limited response to what had been recognized as a wide-
spread problem stemmed from a belief that physicians were in a unique
position to discover child abuse and particularly the battered child syn-
drome.222 As the list of persons required to report expanded,223 the
212. Id. at §11166(b).
213. Id.
214. Id. at §11172(b).
215. Id. at §11165(c).
216. Id.
217. 1976 Cal. Stat. c. 242 §2, at 461.
218. Assembly Committee on Criminal Justice, A. B. 2641, Robinson. (Copy on file at Pacific
Law Journal).
219. Id.; see CAL. PENAL CODE §11172 (a).
220. See supra note 204 and accompanying text.
221. CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5.
222. Interim Committee Report, supra note 12 at 71; Fraser, upra note 4 at 656.
223. See 1965 Cal. Stat. c. 1171, §2, at 2791 (amending/adding CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5)
(adding dentists and resident interns); 1966 Cal. Stat. 1st Ex. Sess., c. 31, §2, at 325, (amend-
ing/adding CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5) (adding school superintendants and principals); 1971
Cal. Stat. c. 1729, §7, at 3680 (amending/adding CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5) (adding teachers,
licensed day care workers and social workers); 1972 Cal. Stat. c. 421 §1, at 746 (amending/adding
CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5) (adding summer day camp or child care center workers); 1973 Cal.
Stat. c. 1151, §1, at 2380 (adding/amending CAL. PENAL CODE §11161.5) (adding Director of
Welfare or Health Dept.); 1977 Cal. Stat. c. 958, §1, at 2908 (amending/adding CAL. PENAL CODE
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legislature attempted to assure that persons on that list would have the
professional skills necessary to assess suspected cases of abuse. Accord-
ingly, the legislature mandated that these persons receive instruction on
the means of detecting child abuse before being licensed by the state. 24
The occupational categories subject to the mandates of section 11166
must report even suspected abuse and are presumed to be uniquely
qualified to make informed judgments2 25 when suspected abuse is not
blatant. These persons are held to a standard of care which exceeds
that required of persons under section 273a. Liability under the report-
ing statute is imposed even when one "should have known" of226 the
abuse. Section 273a, in contrast to the reporting statute, requires that
the omission be willful. Therefore, to be held in violation of section
273a, a person must have knowledge or imputed knowledge that the
child's life is in danger.22 7
Accordingly, no beneficial purpose would be served by holding that
sections 273a and 11166 conflict. Rather, the two statutes are comple-
mentary in that the goal of both is the protection of abused children,
albeit under different situations. Section 273a imposes an affirmative
duty upon any person with knowledge of child abuse to prevent contin-
ued abuse. The presumption of negligence rule can then be applied to
imply a civil duty to report child abuse. In this manner, the common-
law adherence to the distinction between active negligence and omis-
sions may be overcome.
Conclusion
As the law currently stands, the only inducement for most citizens to
protect battered children from abusive caretakers is a moral one. As
shown, however, leaving these decisions exclusively to the realm of per-
sonal conscience provides little protection to the youngest and most
vulnerable members of society. Legal incentives are necessary to com-
pel appropriate action on behalf of the child, and to afford the child a
remedy when legal inducements fail. Once the no duty rule is re-ex-
§11161.5) (adding counselors, psychologists, peace officers and probation officers); 1982 Cal. Stat.
c. 905, §2, at - (amending/adding CAL. PENAL CODE §11166) (adding photo developers).
224. See CAL. Bus. & PROF. Code §§2089, 2091 (physicians and surgeons); CAL. EDUC. CODE
§§448-477 (school nurses); CAL. HEALTH & SAFETY CODE §605 (public health nurses); CAL.
EDUC. CODE §44691 (Dept. of Ed. to instruct school personnel); CAL. PENAL CODE §13517(a)
(guidelines to police agencies to determine the need for protective custody).
225. See Ramsey & Lawler, The Battered Child Syndrome, 1 PEPPERDINE L. REv. 372, 381
(1974); Paulsen, supra note 3 at 3-4.
226. See Landeros v. Flood, 17 Cal. 3d 399, 409, 551 P.2d 389, 393, 131 Cal. Rptr. 69, 73
(1976).
227. See supra notes 172-76 and accompanying text.
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amined, an advocate can readily demonstrate that public policy factors
support the imposition of a duty on all persons to report child abuse.
Three potential theories for granting the child a remedy have been
explored. First, an argument was made that the special circumstances
inherent in the battered child's plight provide sufficient grounds for re-
examining the "no duty to rescue rule." The gravity of the risk of harm
to the child and the relatively simple means of guarding against that
risk support the imposition of a duty of care. Additionally, tort law is
riddled with exceptions to otherwise accepted standards of care when
the risk of injury falls upon children. An alternative means for reach-
ing a more limited class of potential rescuers may be possible through
use of the special relationsho exception. In conformance with a liberal
reading of the special relationship exception, the possibility of holding
friends or family members liable to the child for failure to rescue would
be in keeping with the movement of the law toward finding a duty in
relationships of dependence. To the extent that dependency is in-
volved, few situations manifest a greater need for affirmative action by
others. Third, an argument was made that Penal Code section 273a
already imposes criminal liability upon any person who willfully per-
mits child abuse. This comment also has established that the permis-
sive language embodied in the reporting statute was not intended as an
absolute limitation on the duty to report. Since no legislative policy
stands in the way of imposing a civil duty to report, any violation of
section 273a should implicate the presumption of negligence rule.
While commentators, lawyers, and scholars continue to question the
desirability of the general rule denying liability for nonfeasance, this
comment advocates imposing a duty to rescue abused children on those
who have actual knowledge of the abuse. In the interests of justice, the
helpless child should not be required to bear the onerous burden of
abuse without redress for the cruel indifference of others. The com-
mon-law aversion to liability for nonfeasance may be rational in some
instances, but when infants are endangered and brutalized by their
guardians, the "no duty rule" escapes rationality and serves only to
insulate conduct which is otherwise morally reprehensible.
Susan A. Collier
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